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Introduction: Recent studies of patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) have revealed
disturbances in distinct components of social cognition, such as impaired mentalizing
and empathy. The present study investigated this socio-cognitive profile in MS patients
in more detail, by examining their performance on tasks measuring more fundamental
components of social cognition and any associated disruptions to gray-matter
volume (GMV).
Methods: We compared 43 patients with relapse-remitting MS with 43 age- and
sex-matched healthy controls (HCs) on clinical characteristics (depression, fatigue),
cognitive processing speed, and three aspects of low-level social cognition; specifically,
imitative tendencies, visual perspective taking, and emotion recognition. Using
voxel-based morphometry, we then explored relationships between GMV and these
clinical and behavioral measures.
Results: Patients exhibited significantly slower processing speed, poorer perspective
taking, and less imitation compared with HCs. These impairments were related to
reduced GMV throughout the putamen, thalami, and anterior insula, predominantly in
the left hemisphere. Surprisingly, differences between the groups in emotion recognition
were not significant.
Conclusion: Less imitation and poorer perspective taking indicate a cognitive self-bias
when faced with conflicting self- and other-representations. This suggests that impaired
self-other distinction, and an associated subcortical pattern of GM atrophy, might underlie
the socio-cognitive disturbances observed in MS.
Keywords: multiple sclerosis, social cognition, self-other distinction, automatic imitation, visual perspective
taking, voxel-based morphometry, gray-matter volume
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INTRODUCTION
Multiple sclerosis (MS) is a chronic demyelinating disease of the
central nervous system. As part of a complex neurological
symptomatology, MS patients present frequently with
disturbances in various aspects of cognitive functioning;
slower processing speed, impaired episodic memory and
executive function are among the most affected (1, 2). Another
domain in which dysfunction manifests is social cognition
(3)—that is, the broad repertoire of cognitive and affective skills
that allow us to infer others’ mental and emotional states in
order to interact with them effectively (4, 5). Patients’ quality
of life is reduced considerably by disruptions to their social
environment, and so the development of effective interventions
requires a better understanding of the socio-cognitive deficits
that impact negatively on their interpersonal relationships. Since
the range of abilities comprising social cognition span various
levels of complexity, however, a precise characterization of
these impairments is difficult with standard neuropsychological
tests (6).
Unlike the long history of research into general cognitive
impairments in MS, only recently have studies begun to
unveil the nuanced nature of disturbances in social cognitive
abilities exhibited by these patients. The findings of these
studies often converge to reveal difficulties in lower-level
capacities, particularly in the recognition of negatively valenced
facial emotions [e.g., sadness, anger, fear; (7)]. In contrast,
investigations of other higher-level components of social
cognition provide less consistent insights; while some report
that patients are impaired in their ability to attribute mental
(“mentalizing”) and affective states to others [“empathy”; (8,
9)], other studies have observed disturbances only in cognitive
mentalizing (10, 11). Moreover, it remains to be seen whether
impairments in these high-level facets of social cognition result
from disruptions to more fundamental components.
Although the precise structure of social cognition is yet to
be defined, current research suggests a hierarchical organization
in which lower-level mechanisms contribute to or provide
a necessary prerequisite for higher-level processes (4). In
this model, mentalizing is believed to build upon a more
fundamental ability to take another’s perspective. Consistent
with this notion, both perspective taking and mentalizing
engage the superior temporal/temporo-parietal cortices [e.g.,
(12)]. Similarly, emotion recognition is considered a necessary
prerequisite of empathy, and both processes are associated
frequently with brain responses within the insulae and anterior
cingulate cortex (13–15). More recently, we have shown
that empathic expression is mediated by imitative tendencies,
suggesting that a process of emotional simulation might be
necessary for empathy (16).
Furthermore, multiple components of social cognition are
thought to recruit a common mechanism of self-other distinction
(SOD), which enables us to treat independently and distinguish
flexibly between cognitive self and other representations (15, 17).
Without efficient SOD, we might egocentrically misattribute our
own cognitive and affective states onto others. This would be
evident particularly when our own self states are incongruent
with those of others (18), resulting in poor emotion recognition
and empathic awareness, and inappropriate responding in
social situations. Since the viewpoints of other individuals
often conflict with our own, this mechanism is also necessary
when inferring our interaction partners’ perspective—adopting
another’s perspective requires us to detach ourselves from our
own representations (19). On the other hand, dysfunction to
this low-level cognitive mechanism might result in uncontrolled
self-other merging. Humans exhibit an involuntary tendency to
mimic one another during social interaction (20), which appears
to reflect a common neural coding of self- and other-action
[e.g., (21)]. Control of imitative tendencies therefore requires
SOD to differentiate between our own and others’ actions (17,
22); without this mechanism, we might exhibit hyperimitation
[see (17)]. Consistent with the notion of SOD providing a
mechanism common to both perspective taking and mimicry,
past research has demonstrated that the expression of involuntary
imitation is related inversely to perspective-taking performance
(23, 24). Moreover, SOD is associated frequently with brain
activity in the temporo-parietal cortices (15). Disturbances to
SOD might therefore underlie the higher-level socio-cognitive
deficits observed in MS.
Traditionally, MS has been characterized in terms of white
matter (WM) pathology, but recent research indicates that gray
matter (GM) abnormalities can predict dysfunctional social
cognition in this patient population (25). GM atrophy within
deep nuclei and the limbic system is present in the very
early stages of MS (26), and progresses rapidly in all MS
phenotypes (27). This is observed in the thalamus, putamen,
caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, and amygdala (26, 28). While
other brain regions are associated more frequently with social
cognition, these subcortical structures do appear to play an
important role in socio-cognitive functioning; the limbic and
paralimbic system (including amygdala, striatum, temporal pole,
and anterior cingulate) have been implicated in representation
of self and other mental states, for instance, and the dorsal
striatum has been associated with cognitive mentalizing (29).
Correspondingly, disturbances in social cognition also comprise
the symptomatology of Parkinson’s and Huntington’s disease—
disorders characterized partly by disruptions to cortico-basal
ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuits [e.g., (30)]. Focal GM atrophy
among these structures might therefore contribute to the deficits
in social cognition exhibited in MS. Unfortunately, however,
the majority of research in MS has been performed exclusively
at the behavioral or self-report level (8, 9, 11, 31), with
relatively few studies combining this with neuroimaging data
(25, 32, 33).
To achieve a better characterization of the disturbances in
social cognition exhibited by MS patients, the present study
utilized three experimental tasks designed to measure discrete,
low-level socio-cognitive capacities; specifically, in line with the
model described above (4) we measured emotion recognition,
visual perspective taking, and imitative tendencies. To assess
perspective taking, we measured patients’ performance on a
task that required them to infer other person’s viewpoint
when it is incongruent with their own. To examine emotion
recognition we assessed their ability to infer the emotional state
Frontiers in Neurology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 525
Czekóová et al. Social Cognition in Multiple Sclerosis
TABLE 1 | Sample demographics and clinical characteristics.
Groups
MS HC P
Age (mean [SD]) 35.8 (8.0) 34.7 (11.0) 0.585
Males 12 (28 %) 18 (42 %) 0.175
EDSS (median [range]) 2.5 (6) – –
DD (mean [SD]) 7.5 (4.4) – –
LQ (median [range]) 100 (120) 100 (200) 0.177
University degree 24 (56%) 43 (100%) <0.001
of another person from just their eyes. Finally, to quantify
imitative tendencies we measured the degree to which they
imitated the actions of another person automatically, even when
this interfered with another task. Using GM volume (GMV)
as a metric of brain structure, we then applied voxel-based
morphometry to examine whether any of these behavioral
indices of social cognition were related to patterns of neural
atrophy. Given that MS is associated frequently with a pattern
of GM atrophy throughout deep subcortical nuclei, and the
apparent role of these nuclei in social cognition, we hypothesized
that the degree of GM reduction throughout subcortical
brain structures would be related positively to disruptions
of SOD.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Sample
We recruited 43 patients with relapsing-remitting MS
consecutively from the Department of Neurology at St.
Anne’s University Hospital, Czech Republic, and 43 healthy
controls (HCs) matched on age, sex, and handedness (for details
on demographics, see Table 1). Handedness was assessed with
the revised version of the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (34);
a laterality quotient (LQ) was calculated as (right–left)/(right +
left) × 100. Physical disability was assessed in MS patients with
the Expanded Disability Status Scale [EDSS; (35)]. All patients
had been diagnosed according to the revised McDonald criteria
(36), and had no other neurological or psychiatric diagnoses.
Patients reporting mild to moderate depressive symptoms were
included in the study, but the extent of symptoms reported by
the two groups were not statistically different (see below). The
minimum duration in education was 12 years (i.e., completion
of secondary education). Importantly, the availability of disease-
modifying treatment for MS patients in the Czech Republic
is currently limited to those meeting certain criteria. For this
reason, only 36 of these asymptomatic patients (84%) were
undergoing treatment: interferon beta 1a (n = 9), interferon
beta 1b (n = 3), fingolimod (n = 6), glatiramer acetate (n = 6),
dimethyl fumarate (n = 6), teriflunomide (n = 3), natalizumab
(n = 2), and daklizumab (n = 1). The experiment was approved
by the Institutional Review Board of St. Anne’s University
Hospital, and all individuals provided written informed consent
prior to participating.
Procedure
Participants underwent behavioral assessment prior to brain
scanning, which took place no longer than seven months
afterwards (M= 5.2 months; SD= 1.6). Importantly, no relapses
were presented during these examination periods. The test
battery was performed in a single session lasting ∼1 h, with each
assessment administered in the order in which they are described
below. Implicit task-performance measures were obtained before
explicit and self-report assessments so that the latter could not
influence the former.
Cognitive Processing Speed
To screen for possible cognitive impairment, we employed a
paper version of the Symbol Digit Modalities Test [SDMT; (37)].
This test has been established as a reliable and valid measure of
cognitive processing speed in MS patients, and the best predictor
of cognitive dysfunction in this population given the influence of
processing speed on other cognitive functions (38, 39).
Imitative Tendencies
To measure imitative tendencies we employed a computerized
stimulus–response compatibility procedure (40), whereby
participants are required to execute finger-lifting actions in
response to a colored dot (imperative stimulus) while observing
task-irrelevant finger actions performed by a stimulus hand
(Figure 1A). The degree to which participants are faster and
more accurate at executing finger movements signaled by
the imperative stimulus when they observe simultaneous
matching (compatible) compared with opposing (incompatible)
movements is referred to as automatic imitation, and is
considered an experimental measure of spontaneous mimicry;
higher scores represent greater imitative tendencies. Importantly,
Genschow et al. (41) report high split-half reliability (0.86) for
this compatibility effect.
All trials began with a warning stimulus, comprising a model’s
pronated right hand with all fingers resting on a flat surface but
rotated 90◦ counter-clockwise from the participants’ perspective.
At this point, the participant depressed both the left and right
directional arrows on a standard keyboard with the index and
middle finger of their right hand, respectively. After 800, 1,600, or
2,400ms, selected randomly, the warning stimulus was replaced
with an end-point image of the same stimulus hand performing
either an index or middle finger extension. In this end-point
image, a red or green dot was presented between the index
and middle finger. The color of this dot signaled whether the
participant should move their own index or middle finger (e.g.,
green = index finger, red = middle finger; the color-finger
pairing was counterbalanced across participants). In response to
the imperative stimulus, the participant lifted the corresponding
finger as quickly as possible, thereby releasing a key. The trial then
ended with a blank screen lasting 1,000ms. The task consisted
of three trial types: compatible (the same finger action was
signaled and observed), incompatible (opposite finger actions
were signaled and observed), and baseline (movement was
signaled but not observed). Overall, the paradigm comprised 70
trials−30 compatible, 30 incompatible, and 10 baseline trials—
with accuracy and response time (RT) measured on each trial.
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FIGURE 1 | Examples of experimental stimuli for (A) the Stimulus-response compatibility procedure and (B) the Director Task. (A) A right stimulus hand was
presented at a 90◦ counter-clockwise rotation. In this example, a green dot (imperative stimulus) signals that the participant should lift index finger. Whether the
observed finger movement was the same or different to the one signaled by the imperative stimulus defined the condition (Compatible [Com.] or Incompatible
[Incom.], respectively). (B) An audible instruction given by the Director asked the participant to move one of the items to a new box (“Move the smallest apple one box
down”). On experimental trials (Exp.), the instruction referred to an object that created a discrepancy between the Director’s and participants’ perspectives, while no
such discrepancy existed on control trials; no distractor object was present in Cont. 1, and in Cont. 2 the instruction referred to a different object (“Move the biggest
apple one box down”). Written informed consent was obtained from the individual for the publication of this image. For full instructions, see the
Supplementary Information.
It is important to emphasize that we used a right stimulus hand
rotated 90◦ counter-clockwise. Since participants responded
with their right hands, this stimulus isolated imitative- from
any confounding spatial-compatibility effects to provide a pure
measure of imitative tendencies (24).
Perspective Taking
The Director task was used to assess individuals’ ability to
differentiate between their own visual perspective and that of
another when the two viewpoints conflict [visual perspective
taking; e.g., (42)]. Recently we observed that both RTs and
accuracy demonstrated excellent split-half reliability in each
condition [> 0.96; (16)].
As illustrated in Figure 1B, the stimulus consisted of a grid of
shelves forming 16 boxes, with a different object placed in each
of eight boxes. On each trial, the participant received a recorded
verbal instruction from a female “Director” to move one of the
objects to a different box. The Director sat behind the shelves and
therefore could not see the contents of five boxes with opaque
backs, which were visible only from the participant’s (front)
perspective. On experimental trials, the instruction referred to
an object that created a discrepancy between the Director’s and
participants’ perspectives (e.g., “Move the smallest apple one box
down,” when the director could see only themedium-sized apple).
To perform the instruction correctly on these experimental trials,
the participant had to discount any “distractor” objects not
visible to the Director (e.g., they were required to move the
medium-sized apple rather than the smallest). In both control
conditions, there was no conflicting object to discount: the
distractor was replaced with a non-conflicting object in the
first control condition (Cont.1), and in the second (Cont.2) the
Director’s instruction changed so as to render the distractor
irrelevant (e.g., “Move the biggest apple one box down”). Each
condition comprised 20 trials presented randomly. The audio
recordings of instructions were equivalent across all trials [mean
3.26 (SD .22) sec]. Participants responded by clicking with the
Frontiers in Neurology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 525
Czekóová et al. Social Cognition in Multiple Sclerosis
mouse on the box where the object should be moved. Errors
involved selection of the wrong (e.g., distractor) object or wrong
location, the latter including omission of left–right switching
(moving the target object left one box when they were instructed
to move it rightwards, or vice versa). Any potential difference
in perspectives was emphasized on practice trials that included
a front and rear view of the shelves (see Supplementary Material
for instructions given to participants).
Emotion Recognition
A paper version of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
[RMET; (43)] was employed to measure participants’ ability to
infer the emotional state of others. Although the task is employed
frequently as a measure of affective mentalizing, it is considered
by some scholars to measure only the first stage of this process—
emotion recognition (44). This task contains 36 images depicting
the eye region of actors’ emotional facial expressions. Facial
expressions represent complex emotional states with positive
(e.g., playful, interested), negative (e.g., hostile, suspicious), and
neutral valence (e.g., reflective, pensive). Each image is presented
sequentially, and participants are required to select one of four
labels that best match the expression without a time limit. A sum
of correct responses is used as a measure of success.
Depression
All participants completed the Beck Depression Inventory [BDI-
II; (45)]. Using 21 items, this self-report instrument assesses
cognitive, affective, physiological and motivational symptoms of
depression experienced over the preceding 2 weeks. Scores of 20–
28 indicate moderate depression. The BDI-II has been found to
be a valid and reliable instrument for the evaluation of depressive
symptoms in MS (46).
Fatigue
Patients and controls completed the Modified Fatigue Impact
Scale [MFIS; (47)], a self-report instrument that assesses the
degree to which physical, cognitive, and psychosocial fatigue
experienced over the preceding 4 weeks has affected every-
day functions.
MRI Acquisition
High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired
on a 1.5T Siemens Symphony scanner, using a standard 32-
channel array head coil and an MPRAGE sequence: 176 sagittal
slices (slice thickness= 1.17mm); TR= 1,700ms, TE= 3.93ms,
TI = 1,100ms, flip angle = 15◦; in plane matrix size 256 ×
256, resampled to 512 × 512, FOV = 246 × 246mm, in-plane
resolution= 0.48× 0.48 mm.
Statistical Analyses
Behavioral Data
Differences between the groups were assessed using parametric
or non-parametric t-tests, depending on the normality of
variable distributions. Independent-samples t- and Mann-
Whitney U-tests were employed to contrast MS patients
with HCs. Since normality was violated for the majority of
the variables, associations between them were examined by
Spearman correlation coefficients, all of which were entered
into a multivariate bootstrapping procedure (1,000 iterations) to
obtain 95% confidence intervals (CIs). These intervals provide an
estimate of population values for each coefficient, providing an
alternative measure of significance; CIs including zero should be
considered unreliable.
For calculating measures of imitative tendencies and
perspective taking, we employed an approach that we have
used previously to investigate relationships between these
two components of social cognition (16, 24). The strength of
imitative tendencies was expressed as the difference in response
time (RT) between the incompatible relative to the compatible
condition, and perspective-taking performance was expressed
as the difference in RT and accuracy on the experimental
relative to the control conditions. Importantly, there was
no evidence of a speed-accuracy trade-off for perspective
taking in this sample (p = 0.165), so relative measures for
RT and accuracy scores were calculated separately. For both
measures, responses on the control condition were regressed
from those in the corresponding experimental condition(s),
resulting in residualized scores that reflect the difference
between the conditions: specifically, greater residuals reflect
poorer performance (slower RTs and poorer accuracy in the
experimental relative to the control conditions. It is important
to emphasize that measures of both imitation and perspective
taking are relative (RTs on incompatible vs. compatible trials,
and experimental vs. control trials, respectively), and should
therefore be uninfluenced by any differences in processing speed
between MS patients and HCs. The statistical analyses were
performed using SPSS 24 software.
Neuroimaging Data
To compare GMV between the brains of HCs and MS patients
we analyzed MR images with the optimized VBM pipeline
provided in FSL (48). This analysis pipeline produces results
that converge closely with those from the Statistical Parametric
Mapping platform (49).
First, the anatomical images were brain-extracted and
segmented into GM, WM and cerebrospinal fluid using FAST
(50), and the resulting GM partial-volume maps were affine-
registered to the MNI-152 standard space template using FLIRT
(51). The registered GM images from the entire sample (both
HCs and MS patients) were then concatenated and averaged, and
flipped along the x-axis. By re-averaging each mirror image to
the MNI-152 template, a first-pass left-right symmetric, study-
specific “affine” GM template was created. This step avoids
introducing any bias during the registration process. Second,
all native GM images were re-registered non-linearly to the
affine template with FNIRT (52), concatenated, averaged, and
flipped along the x-axis. Symmetric, study-specific “non-linear”
GM templates were then created by averaging both mirror
images, and native GM partial-volume maps were registered
to their corresponding non-linear template. Importantly, this
optimized protocol modulates each registered GM image to
compensate for any contraction/enlargement due to the non-
linear transformation; specifically, each voxel of each image
was multiplied by the Jacobian of the warp field [see (53)].
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Since this modulation does not include the affine part of
the registration, however, no correction for total intracranial
volume is needed (48). The modulated GM images were
then smoothed with an isotropic Gaussian kernel with a
sigma of 3 mm.
General Linear Modeling (GLM) was then applied to the
resampled, smoothed and modulated GM images to assess
localized differences between the HC and MS group. Since
MS is characterized by localized WM lesions, appearing as
hypointensities on T1 images that can result in an overestimation
of GMV, we added to these group comparisons a covariate
of no interest representing subject-specific values of mean
WM calculated from the corresponding partial-volume
map. Subsequently, by adding measures from patients’
clinical assessment or behavior on each experimental task
as covariate regressors in further GLM analyses, we examined
whether localized GMV in the MS group was related to
clinical characteristics or socio-cognitive performance. Using
randomize (37), all resulting statistical maps were thresholded
with permutation-based non-parametric inference; 5,000
permutations were performed with threshold-free cluster
enhancement (54), and family-wise error (FWE)-corrected for
multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
The values below present means (±SD).
Clinical Assessment
The MS patients performed worse than the HCs on the SDMT
(56.42 [±9.26] vs. 69.21 [±10.00]; t(84) = 6.154; p < 0.001, d =
1.33), and reported greater fatigue on the MFIS (29.65 [±12.99]
vs. 18.72 [±13.59]; U = 518.00; p < 0.001; r = 0.38). Although
the MS group also expressed more depression (10.53 [±8.20] vs.
7.35 [±6.06]), this difference was not statistically significant (p=
0.055; r = 0.21; see Figure 2A).
Behavioral Performance
Five MS patients and three HCs were excluded from the analyses
of perspective-taking performance because they achieved a
score of zero in the experimental condition of the Director
Task, suggesting a misunderstanding of task instructions. Both
imitation and perspective taking differed between the groups:
compared with HCs, patients showed significantly less imitation
(23.78 [±30.22] vs. 38.97 [±32.89] ms; t(84) =2.23, p = 0.028; d
= 0.48), and both longer response time (0.21 [±1.14] vs. −0.20
[±0.79]; U = 525.00, p= 0.019; r = 0.27) and poorer accuracy in
perspective taking (−0.20 [±0.97] vs. 0.20 [±0.99]; U = 649.00,
p = 0.017, r = 0.26). Surprisingly, however, emotion recognition
was similar in the MS patients and HCs (24.74 [±3.44] vs. 25.81
[±3.57]); U = 731.50, p= 0.094; r = 0.18; See Figures 2B,C).
Correlations between the clinical assessments and socio-
cognitive measures revealed significant relationships only
between disease duration and accuracy in perspective taking
(ρ(36) =−0.36; p= 0.026; CI= [−0.62,−0.06]). No associations
emerged with respect to other measures of social cognition
(p ≥ 0.086), or self-reported fatigue and depression (p ≥
FIGURE 2 | Comparisons between the HC and MS group in (A) clinical
assessment and cognitive processing speed, (B) emotion recognition and
imitative tendencies, and (C) response time and accuracy in visual perspective
taking. *p < 0.05.
0.257; see Table S1). As expected, there were no significant
relationships between cognitive processing speed (SDMT scores)
and any measure of socio-cognitive performance (p ≥ 0.217, see
Table S2).
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TABLE 2 | Results of voxel-based morphometry analyses, presenting peak voxels
of clusters in which gray matter volume was higher in the HC relative to the MS
group (HC > MS; pFWE < 0.01), or associated with imitation (IMI),
perspective-taking performance (VPT) or clinical characteristics (EDSS;
pFWE < 0.05).
Label # Voxels Peak x y z
HC > MS Thalamus R 10638 5.00 15 −26 3
Insula/opercular cortex R 2532 4.52 47 5 1
Temporal pole R 1740 4.68 40 10 −32
Planum temporale R 1168 4.16 55 −25 13
Caudate nucleus L 160 4.06 −20 3 17
Insula (posterior) R 25 3.28 40 −16 −2
IMI Thalamus L 236 3.73 −10 22 10
Insula (anterior) L 5 3.47 32 24 10
VPT Putamen L 8 3.23 −26 4 −8
EDSS Amygdala L 59 4.02 −22 −4 −14
R 40 4.54 16 −4 −14
Caudate L 40 4.54 16 −4 −14
Neuroanatomy
A whole-brain GLM analysis revealed a diffuse collection of
cortical and subcortical regions in which GMV was reduced
in MS patients relative to HCs, after accounting for variability
in mean WMV (p < 0.01, FWE-corrected): this encompassed
right lateral temporal cortex and the amygdala; and the bilateral
amygdala, caudate nucleus, pallidum, putamen, thalamus, and
hippocampus. We refer to this herein as GMoverall, and these
results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3A. Interestingly,
only cognitive processing speed (SDMT scores) was related with
GMoverall–higher processing speed was associated with more
GMV throughout this pattern of brain regions (ρ(41) = 0.36, p
= 0.019; CI= [0.01, 0.63]; see Figure 4A).
When adding clinical measures as covariates in GLM analyses
of MS patients, neither disease duration nor SDMT scores
showed significant associations with localized GMV. Scores on
the EDDS, however, were associated negatively with GMV in the
bilateral amygdalae and left caudate nucleus (p < 0.05, FWE-
corrected). In terms of performance on the experimental tasks,
accuracy in perspective taking was associated positively with
GMV in a small ventral aspect of the left putamen (N = 38; p <
0.05, FWE-corrected). To investigate relationships between brain
structure and behavior on the tasks expressed as response time,
we added SDMT scores as an additional covariate of no interest;
although we observed no significant relationships between task
performance and cognitive processing speed, this allowed us to
identify brain-behavior relationships that were independent of
general processing speed. Response times in perspective taking
showed no significant associations with GMV, but the degree
of imitative tendencies demonstrated on the stimulus–response
compatibility procedure was associated positively with GMV in a
large portion of the left thalamus and left anterior insula cortex
(N = 43; p < 0.05, FWE-corrected). These results are presented
in Figure 3B and Table 2, and Figure 4 plots selected significant
brain-behavior relationships across the MS sample.
FIGURE 3 | Results of voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analyses. (A) Brain
regions expressing greater gray-matter volume (GMV) in the HC relative to MS
group (p < 0.01, FWE-corrected). (B) Brain regions in which GMV was
associated positively with imitation measured on the Stimulus-response
compatibility procedure (IMI) and accuracy of visual perspective taking on the
Director Task (VPT), and negatively with clinical scores (EDDS; p < 0.05,
FW-corrected). VBM results are presented on the Colin template in MNI space,
neurological orientation, with values presenting the x, y, or z coordinate of the
corresponding slice.
Finally, since our sample varied in achieved education level
(see Table 1), we investigated whether this might have influenced
the above findings; specifically, we compared both GMV and
behavioral performance between the 19 patients with secondary
school education and 24 with university degrees. Using the exact
same parameters with randomize, no significant differences were
observed between these two patient subgroups. The same (null)
result was obtained when contrasting cognitive, socio-cognitive,
and self-report scores (p ≥ 0.140).
DISCUSSION
This study sought to achieve a better characterization of the
disruptions to social cognition observed in MS by investigating
lower-level facets of socio-cognitive abilities, and examining the
neuroanatomical correlates of any impairments. Our findings
indicate that, behaviorally, patients with relapse-remitting MS
exhibit less involuntarily imitation toward the actions of others
compared with HCs, and find it more difficult to adopt
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FIGURE 4 | Scatter plots illustrating significant brain-behavior relationships for the MS group. (A) Positive association between cognitive processing speed (SDMT)
and the overall pattern of relative GMV decline (GMoverall; left), and negative association between EDSS scores and GMV in the left amygdala (left). (B) Positive
associations between accuracy in perspective taking and GMV in the left putamen (left), and imitative tendencies and GMV in the left thalamus (middle) and left
insula (right).
another individual’s perspective when it differs from their own.
Furthermore, this behavioral pattern is associated with reduced
GMV in the patient group within deep brain nuclei, revealing a
potential neuroanatomical correlate.
To our knowledge, this is the first neurobehavioral
investigation of imitative tendencies and visual perspective
taking in a neurological population. On the basis of our own
and others’ previous research, we interpret the pattern of
behavior exhibited by our sample of MS patients to reflect
impaired self-other distinction [SOD; (4, 16, 24)]. Efficient
perspective-taking performance is shown by individuals who can
switch flexibly between altercentric and egocentric viewpoints,
and report a balanced attentional focus between the self and
others during social interactions (55). In contrast, MS patients
appear to fall back on a default cognitive state of self-bias
when faced with competing self- and other-representations
(56)—they appear to be less able to detach themselves from their
own self-perspective in order to infer conflicting viewpoints.
Likewise, MS patients are less influenced by others’ actions.
Interestingly, we observed the same pattern of behavior in a
large healthy sample; specifically, poorer perspective taking and
reduced imitation was observed in individuals characterized by
an inflexible personality profile compared with those exhibiting
more flexibility (16). In this light, the disturbances presented
by MS patients in high-level socio-cognitive capacities, such as
mentalizing, might reflect dysfunction to a more fundamental,
low-level cognitive mechanism responsible for distinguishing
flexibly between self and other representations.
In contrast to previous research (8, 25, 57), MS patients
performed equally as well as HCs on a task measuring emotion
recognition (RMET). While this might indicate that emotion
recognition is preserved in this sample of MS patients, it
may simply highlight an important difference between the
three experimental tasks we employed; namely, their differential
requirements for fast and flexible switching between self and
other representations: While successful performance on the
Director Task (DT) and Stimulus-response Compatibility (SRC)
procedure necessitates swift SOD, the RMET involves a selection
of one of four choices describing the mental states expressed
by eyes, placing less demands on SOD flexibility. In a similar
vein, differential performance on these tasks could result from
their different demands on executive function; both the DT and
SRC procedure are essentially response inhibition tasks, whereby
successful performance necessitates the speeded selection of
relevant and suppression of irrelevant information [e.g., (58)].
This is less true of the RMET. Indeed, we suggested that
individual differences in cognitive control might underlie the
opposing behaviors we observed previously between flexible and
inflexible personality profiles (16). It is particularly noteworthy
that we also observed equivalent empathic responses between
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these two profiles. Since the present study did not perform a
thorough assessment of executive functioning in MS patients, we
are unable to make further claims about its influence of SOD.
However, recent research points to the functional independence
of executive dysfunction and impairments to social cognition in
the MS population [see (59)].
In line with previous research, our measures of social
cognition were not associated with self-reported depression
(3, 7–9), fatigue (11), or cognitive decline [(8, 11); but see
(3)]. This suggests that these frequent symptoms of MS do
not predict disturbances in social cognition on their own.
Additionally, we observed no relationships between physical
disability and our measures of socio-cognitive performance. In
contrast, poorer accuracy in perspective taking was associated
with disease duration.
Turning now to our neuroanatomical findings, the pattern of
GMV reduction we have observed in MS patients aligns closely
with previous studies; these structural alterations occurred in the
thalamus, putamen, caudate nucleus, globus pallidus, and the
amygdala, structures in which GM atrophy frequently appears
first and progresses rapidly (26–28). Furthermore, relationships
between gray matter and task performance in a selection of
these deep brain structures implicate them in the socio-cognitive
impairments exhibited by MS patients; reduced GMV was
associated with poorer perspective taking in the left putamen, and
reduced automatic imitation in the thalami and the left anterior
insula (AI), independent of cognitive processing speed. Although
the neuroanatomical basis of socio-cognitive disturbances in
MS remains understudied (60), these results do converge with
studies in the healthy population: First, brain function within
the dorsal striatum is reported during the cognitive aspect of
mentalizing (29), when differentiating between social actions
performed by the self and others, and when processing social
behavior in general (61). Second, recent research indicates that
intact functioning of thalamus is critical for dynamic integration
of information across various cortical networks (62), including
those implicated in socio-cognitive and -affective processes [e.g.,
mentalizing; see (29)]. Interestingly, this region seems to be
integral for behavioral flexibility (63)—a role that may extend
to flexible self-other switching. Third, previous research has
associated brain function within the AI with imitative tendencies
(5), as well as processes of interoception, empathy, and social
awareness (64). Although the majority of existing studies have
linked AI with affective components of social cognition, the left
AI has been reported to be activated by both emotional and
cognitive aspects (13).
It is noteworthy that all GM areas associated significantly
with social cognition were localized primarily to the left
hemisphere. Although this observation is in line with other
findings reporting a predominantly left-lateralized network
of brain regions associated with other aspects of social
cognition (65), research into the lateralization of disturbances
exhibited by MS patients remains scarce and inconsistent
(25); socio-cognitive processes have been related to GMV
throughout both left and right hemisphere (33, 65). Interestingly,
previous research has indicated that cognitive flexibility is
associated with brain regions in the left hemisphere (66),
while self-referential processing is linked primarily with the
right (67). As such, it might be that our results reflect a
selective deficit of cognitive flexibility and preserved self-
processing. This finding, then, presents a new avenue of
investigation in MS.
Given the potential for functional neuroimaging as an
evaluative tool for the early detection of brain alterations in MS,
future studies should explore the brain networks engaged by the
two experimental tasks we have used to reveal disruptions in
SOD. It is important to acknowledge that we have investigated
GM volume in what is primarily a WM disorder. While patterns
of GM pathology appear to be associated more heavily with
cognitive dysfunction in MS than concomitant WM lesions
(68), diffuse WM abnormalities are likely to result in the
disconnection of brain networks supporting social cognition
(32). Interestingly, Plata-Bello et al. (69) report decreased
functional connectivity in the brains of MS patients relative
to HCs during action observation/execution. Future research
should investigate whether the subcortical pattern of GMV
reduction that we have observed in MS is related to a loss of
WM integrity.
It is important to acknowledge aspects of our study that might
limit the generalization of the present results. First, we examined
only one index of cognitive functioning—scores on the SDMT.
Although this is considered a gold-standard screening tool in
MS, and a reliable predictor of cognitive decline in MS (38, 39),
we were unable to explore relationships between social cognition
and other, more general cognitive domains. As alluded to earlier,
the DT and SRC procedure are believed to require response
inhibition (58). Amore detailed neuropsychological examination
of cognitive performance might provide better insights into the
relationship between this aspect of executive function and low-
level components of social cognition. Second, the group of MS
patients recruited in this study differed significantly in their level
of educational attainment from those in the HC group. While
this difference did not manifest in either behavioral performance
or our metric of brain structure, the results of the present
study should be treated with caution until they are replicated
in comparisons of more educationally balanced MS patients and
healthy controls. Third, behavioral assessment was performed 5
months prior to brain scanning on average. While substantial
GM atrophy is unlikely to occur during this time interval in
MS patients with cognitive reserve (70), it is possible that new
WM lesions could have developed. On a related note, because
this study recruited a sample of asymptomatic MS patients,
a non-routine MRI protocol was performed that involved the
acquisition of only T1-weighted images. Lesions of WM appear
as hypointensities on T1 images, resulting potentially in an
overestimation of GMV. We have attempted to control for this
by adding estimates of total WMV calculated from the same T1
image as a covariate of no interest. This is a crude approach,
however, and much more accurate methods are available; with
the addition of T2-weighted images, automated WM lesion-
detection tools (71) can provide accurate estimates of focal
lesion load, allowing for lesionmasking that improves volumetric
estimation [e.g., (25)]. As such, although the brain-behavior
relationships we have observed in the present study converge
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closely with previous research, our findings require replication
in future research that addresses these limitations.
In conclusion, our study revealed a potential low-
level cognitive mechanism underlying the socio-cognitive
disturbances exhibited by patients with MS; at the behavioral
level, the performance of MS patients indicated increased
self-bias when faced with conflicting self- and other-
representations—while emotion recognition seems to be
preserved, they showed poorer perspective taking and less
involuntary imitation. These selective behavioral impairments
were associated with a pattern of reduced GMV that encompasses
deep brain nuclei, pointing toward a neuroanatomical correlate
for this socio-cognitive profile. Future research should build on
our findings by clarifying the influence of structural alterations
in these discrete brain structures on SOD, and how this manifests
in other socio-cognitive capacities.
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